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This paper applies regression analysis to investigate the fundamental factors of the variation 
of CDS index tranches. The sample comprises daily data on the tranche premia of the 
European iTraxx and North American CDX index from the start of the market in summer 2004 
to January 2008. I estimate the relationship between tranche premia and market-based 
measures of credit risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk. In this context, I analyse how the 
set of explanatory factors has changed since the start of the credit market turmoil in 2007. 
Overall, I find that pricing of CDX and iTraxx tranches differs although the specifications of the 
two contracts are very similar. Since July 2007, tranche investors appear to have repriced 
CDX contracts to a larger extent than iTraxx contracts. Credit risk and liquidity factors are 
JEL classification: E43, G12, G13, G 14;  
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priced in almost all tranches with liquidity risk playing a larger role since the start of the turmoil. 5
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The development of a market for credit risk transfer represents a major structural innovation 
in the financial system. This market offers a wide range of instruments to deal with different 
aspects of credit risk. Besides providing default protection for individual firms through credit 
default swaps (CDS), the credit risk in entire credit portfolios can be traded by means of 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs).  
Essentially, a CDO represents a set of claims of varying exposure to the cash flows from a 
portfolio of credit instruments. These new claims or ‘tranches’ range from ‘equity tranches’ 
with high risk exposure to ‘senior tranches’, where expected losses are much smaller. 
Investor interest in CDOs grew rapidly because in these instruments, the degree of credit risk 
exposure, the desired degree of leverage, the maturity, and the cash flow structure can all be 
tailored to meet an investor’s preferences.  
A major step in the development of the CDO market was the introduction of the iTraxx credit 
index in summer 2004. The launch of this commonly accepted benchmark has created an 
active market for standardised iTraxx tranches in Europe and CDX tranches in North America. 
Hence, firm-specific credit risk can be traded through credit default swaps, and the correlation 
of credit risk within the underlying credit portfolio can be traded through credit index tranches. 
As tranche prices depend on credit correlation, this segment of the credit market is also 
known as the “correlation market”.  
Even before the subprime turmoil which started in summer 2007 market participants faced 
sizable challenges in the valuation of their CDO positions. In particular, two issues made the 
CDO valuation more complex than the pricing of many other financial instruments. First, for 
most CDOs there is no active trading. Typically, an investment bank sells the tranches in 
private transactions to an insurance firm, hedge fund or pension fund. As these transactions 
represent “tailor-made’ instruments, investors usually hold these securities in their books until 
maturity, making secondary trading quite illiquid. Second, the theoretical valuation of CDOs is 
particularly complex as it requires accurate and up-to-date estimation of the comovement of 
defaults among the entities in the credit portfolio backing the CDO. However, estimation of the 
credit risk correlations poses significant challenges both from a data perspective as well as 
from a modelling perspective. For example, the pricing of a typical CDO based on 100 
corporate loans would require estimation of the default comovement of 100 firms. 
The general repricing of credit risk since summer 2007 has rekindled doubts concerning the 
validity of the currently available CDO pricing models. Many market participants found out that 
they could not correctly price or measure the risks in these instruments. Due to the 
weaknesses of mark-to-market and mark-to-model valuations many investors had overly 
relied on rating agencies for their risk assessment. However as the drawbacks of the rating 
agency models became widely known, investors lost confidence in CDO valuations in general. 6
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Eventually, investors’ attempts to reduce their CDO exposures brought market activity to an 
almost complete standstill.  
My paper aims to help understand the functioning of the CDO market. For this purpose, I 
analyse the determinants of the movement in CDS index tranche premia. The weaknesses in 
existing theoretical models provide a strong motivation for my exploratory approach. My data-
driven methodology does not rely on the functional form of a specific pricing model but rather 
tests the explanatory power of variables which should in theory explain price variation. A 
second motivation for my approach is that trading in CDS index tranches is quite active. This 
implies that prices should contain relevant information about how credit traders price 
standardised CDOs. 
I relate a variety of financial market variables to the first differences of log tranche premia and 
test how the turmoil in credit markets has affected the explanatory value of the determinants 
of tranche premia. I include proxies for overall portfolio credit risk, credit risk correlation, the 
yield curve, risk aversion and measures of market liquidity. Furthermore, I conduct a variety of 
robustness tests and I also examine the economic significance of my results.  
My sample comprises daily data on the tranche premia of the iTraxx (European) and CDX 
(North American) index. The sample period is from summer 2004 to January 2008. I study all 
six index tranches based on the iTraxx and CDX Main index. My empirical analysis covers 
instruments ranging from the riskiest equity tranche (covering 0% to 3% of the joint loss 
distribution of the index credit portfolio) to the least risky super senior tranche (ranging up to 
100% of the joint loss distribution of the index credit portfolio).  
One of my main findings is that declining risk appetite and heightened concerns about market 
liquidity, both of which have characterised investor behaviour since summer 2007, have 
provided a sizable contribution to the observed strong increase in tranche premia. Overall, the 
results imply that even in the most liquid segment of the CDO market, market prices still 
contain a sizable liquidity premium. I also find differences in the pricing of CDX and iTraxx 
tranches although the design of both contracts is almost identical. Since July 2007, tranche 
investors appear to have repriced CDX contracts more substantially than iTraxx contracts.7
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Introduction 
The market turmoil which started in summer 2007 in the US subprime segment has raised 
concerns among market participants and policymakers about the valuation of collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs).  A market wide reassessment of risk led to sharp increases in credit 
spreads across all segments of the credit market. The rapidly falling market values of credit 
investors started a “flight to safety”. The best illustration of the intensity of the subprime 
turmoil is the fact that it led to the collapse of Bear Stearns, a major US investment bank, in 
March 2008. 
A CDO is an instrument which enables investors to trade slices of the credit risk in a credit 
portfolio. Specifically, a CDO consists of claims (‘tranches’) with varying exposures to the 
cash-flows from an underlying portfolio of credit instruments such as bonds, loans or credit 
default swaps (CDS). CDOs are a relatively recent financial innovation as they have only 
been actively used for less than ten years. However, in this short time span, the CDO market 
has grown strongly, rapidly becoming a major segment of the fixed income market. In 2006 
global issuance of US dollar- and euro-denominated cash and synthetic CDOs was US$ 994 
billion (BIS, 2007). 
Overall, the CDO market consists of an actively traded segment and an illiquid “buy and hold” 
segment. In the actively traded CDO segment, the underlying credit portfolio is based on the 
standardised portfolio of a CDS index such as the iTraxx (European) or CDX (North 
American) index. These index-based CDOs, also known as CDS index tranches, can be seen 
as the “tip of the iceberg” of the CDO market segment and they provide the sample for this 
paper. Compared to many other credit instruments, trading in CDS index tranches is quite 
active: In 2006, trading in CDS index tranches amounted to U$ 1,736 billion (BIS, 2007).  
For a large fraction of CDOs there is no active trading and valuation needs to rely on model 
estimates rather than market prices. This second segment of the CDO market consists of 
tailor-made instruments and it has been the source of sizable losses for many market 
participants. These “bespoke” securities are frequently sold in private transactions where an 
institutional investor (e.g. an insurer) can choose the underlying credit portfolio or the 
structure of cash-flows. The specific features in these transactions limit the development of an 
active secondary market and investors have to hold these securities until maturity. When 
banks sell these non-standard CDOs in the primary market they rely on the market prices of 
the CDS index tranches for the pricing of the bespoke instruments.  
Currently there is no reliable model to arrive at commonly accepted CDO valuations which 
creates major valuation uncertainties for CDO investors. Duffie (2007, p.4) argues that “even 
specialists in collateralized debt obligations are currently ill equipped to measure the risks and 
 For discussions of the subprime turmoil see Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008), Borio (2008) or Brunnermeier (2008). 





instruments reduced both the capital as well as the profitability of the banking system and 8
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fair valuation of tranches that are sensitive to default correlation”. A key challenge in CDO 
valuation is the accurate estimation of the comovement of defaults, which poses significant 
challenges both from a data perspective as well as from a modelling perspective. Due to the 
weaknesses of mark-to-market and mark-to-model valuations many investors overly relied on 
rating agencies for their risk assessment. However as the drawbacks of the rating agency 
models became widely known, investors lost confidence in CDO valuations in general. 
Eventually, investors’ attempts to reduce their CDO exposures brought market activity to an 
almost complete standstill.  
In this paper, I use a regression-based approach to investigate the determinants of the 
changes in the market prices of CDS indexes tranches. The explanatory variables in my 
regression analysis are measures of credit risk, liquidity risk, risk aversion and interest rate 
risk. In the literature on understanding credit spreads the regression-based approach has 
been introduced by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). This approach has the advantage that it can 
make use of a comprehensive set of potential explanatory factors such as liquidity factors or 
proxies for risk aversion. Furthermore it is not constrained by the specification of a particular 
theoretical model. 
My comprehensive analysis is designed to provide general insights into the market pricing of 
index tranches. The sample comprises daily data on the tranche premia of the iTraxx and 
CDX index from the start of trading in summer 2004 to January 2008. The iTraxx and CDX 
tranches are structured almost identically with the main difference being the composition and 
credit quality of the underlying credit portfolio. Specifically, I analyse the six iTraxx and CDX 
Main index tranches which range from the riskiest equity tranche (covering 0% to 3% of the 
joint loss distribution) to the least risky super senior tranche (ranging up to 100% of the joint 
loss distribution).  
I relate a number of financial market variables to the first differences of log tranche premia. I 
include proxies for overall portfolio credit risk, credit risk correlation, the yield curve and 
measures of market liquidity. Here, I also test the explanatory value of a proxy for risk 
aversion for tranche premia. Furthermore, I focus on how the turmoil in credit markets has 
affected the weight of the determinants of tranche premia. The weaknesses in existing 
theoretical models provide an additional motivation for my exploratory approach, which is not 
based on the functional form of a specific pricing model but rather tests the explanatory power 
of variables which should in theory explain price variation. 
My approach complements the small number of empirical papers on CDS index tranches. The 
papers available so far focus on the performance of CDO valuation models for pricing US 
CDX tranches and in almost all cases their sample periods do not capture the repricing since 
summer 2007. Longstaff and Rajan (2008) find that a three-factor portfolio credit model 
explains virtually all of the time-series and crosssectional variation in CDX tranche premia. 
Bhansali et al. (2008) use a more simplified specification of the same model to study the 
turmoil period. They find that the subprime turmoil has more than twice the systemic risk of 9
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the May 2005 downgrade of GM and Ford. Tarashev and Zhu (2007) document a large 
correlation risk premium in CDX tranche prices. Coval et al. (2007) apply fundamental asset 
pricing theory to price CDX tranches. Feldhuetter (2007) implements intensity-based models, 
finding that pricing performance differs across CDX tranches. Eckner (2007) decomposes the 
risks priced in CDX tranches. A similar exercise is conducted by Azizpour and Giesecke 
(2008). 
My main finding is that there are significant differences in the determinants of the market 
prices of CDX tranches and the iTraxx tranches. Proxies for credit risk and for market liquidity 
are priced in almost all iTraxx and CDX tranches. Despite the same structure of the 
instruments, tranche investors however appear to use different pricing methods for CDX and 
iTraxx tranches, in particular since July 2007. Furthermore, although there are a number of 
significant relations between tranche premia and explanatory variables, the premia also still 
contain a strong common unobservable component. 
As regards the impact of the turmoil, I find that declining risk appetite and heightened 
concerns about market liquidity, both of which have characterised investor behaviour since 
summer 2007, have provided a sizable contribution to the observed strong increase in 
tranche premia. Furthermore, tranche investors have revised their valuation of the CDX 
contracts more substantially than their pricing of iTraxx contracts. One potential explanation 
for this difference is the heterogeneous development of the credit market turmoil, which 
started in US financial markets and which has affected the US growth outlook more than 
growth forecasts for the euro area. In this context, a caveat is that at the time of writing, the 
period of repricing had not yet come to an end. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section I, I discuss the mechanism of CDS 
index tranches and the sample. Section II describes the results of the empirical analysis. 
Section III concludes the paper by summarising the main results. 
I. The Market for CDS Index Tranches  
A. The Mechanics of CDS Index Tranches 
CDS are the most commonly traded credit derivatives and function like a traded insurance 
contract against the losses arising to its creditors from a firm’s default. They transfer the risk 
that a certain individual entity defaults from the “protection buyer” to the “protection seller” in 
exchange for the payment of a premium. Should the reference entity default the buyer 
commonly receives the difference between the notional amount of the loan and its recovery 
value from the protection seller. In a CDS transaction, the premium paid by the protection 
buyer to the protection seller is expressed as an annualised percentage of the transaction’s 
notional value and it provides the market quote for the CDS (usually in basis points).  
In June 2004, a harmonised global family of CDS indices was launched, namely iTraxx in 
Europe and Asia and CDX in North America. The launch of this credit index family has 
provided a commonly accepted benchmark for credit markets. The indices represent the CDS 10
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premium on an equally weighted basket of the currently most actively traded firms. All indices 
are updated on a daily frequency. Based on a semi-annual poll of the main CDS dealers, the 
index composition is revised twice a year to reflect changes in liquidity and credit quality.   
The iTraxx and CDX Main indices are designed to represent the investment grade segment of 
the US$ and euro credit markets. The indices contain energy firms, industrial entities, 
consumer cyclical and non-cyclical firms, insurance companies, banks, telecoms as well as 
automobile firms. The CDS premium on the Main index represents the price of credit 
protection on the entire pool of firms, i.e. a portfolio credit default swap covering all 125 firms 
in the index.    
Index CDS essentially trade like CDS on a single firm. In case of a firm’s default, the 
defaulted firm is removed from the index portfolio and the nominal value of the contract 
declines by 1/125, i.e. 0.8 %. According to market information, trading activity is concentrated 
in the 5 year maturity and therefore this horizon is the focus of the following analysis. In 
addition, my analysis focuses on the ‘on-the- run’ series, which is rolled over every half year 
to the new index composition according to the current poll’s ranking of firms’ CDS. 
Given the iTraxx / CDX index composition, the corresponding CDO structure comprises 
instruments with varying degrees of exposure to the joint loss distribution of the 125 firms. 
These tranches hence provide claims to the cash flows of the iTraxx CDS portfolio and in 
parallel serve as protection for a certain range of defaults in the portfolio. The equity tranche 
serves as the first level of protection against any defaults among the firms in the index and is 
therefore also called the ‘first loss piece’. The following levels of default protection are 
provided by mezzanine and by senior tranches, where investors’ exposure to default risk in 
the portfolio is smaller than in the equity tranche.   
Specifically, the six iTraxx Main index tranches are equity (range from 0% to 3% of the joint 
loss distribution), Low Mezzanine (3% - 6%), Mid Mezzanine (6% - 9%), High Mezzanine (9% 
- 12%), senior (12% - 22%) and super senior (22% to 100 %). CDX tranches have slightly 
different attachment points, namely 0% to 3%, 3% to 7%, 7% to 10%, 10% to 15%, 15% to 
30% and 30% to 100 %.   
Collectively, the six tranches represent the entire capital structure of the CDS index portfolio 
and can be interpreted as options on the joint loss distribution. In total, the six tranches cover 
all the possible losses arising from defaults in the CDS index portfolio. In parallel, all cash 
flows from the CDS index portfolio are paid out, starting from the senior tranches and ending 
 For a more detailed description, see Calamaro et al. (2004). 
 In practice, there is a small difference between the portfolio CDS and the average across the 125 firms’ CDS. This 
difference is known as the ‘basis’ and is caused by contractual differences and supply/demand effects. 
 In the market terminology, the investor in a certain tranche, i.e. the buyer of credit portfolio risk, is selling protection 
 Due to the dependence of tranche prices on credit correlations, the CDS index tranche segment is also known as 
the ‘correlation market’. Hence, firm-specific credit risk is traded through CDS and the correlation of credit risk within 
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with the equity tranche. Tranche trading takes place in the over-the-counter market among 
banks and brokers. Because the instruments are constructed as synthetic single-tranche 
CDOs investors can buy or sell all tranches individually. 
In case of a credit event such as a default, the procedure is as follows. After the first firm in 
the index has defaulted, the buyer of the equity tranche, i.e. the seller of protection has to pay 
compensation to the buyer of equity protection. After six defaults , the equity tranche records 
a total loss and hence its 3 % upper limit becomes effective. Consequently, the protection 
against any additional defaults until the maturity of the instrument is now provided by the 
holder of the First Mezzanine tranche, which in the iTraxx case covers the 3% to 6% segment 
of the joint loss distribution. In the absence of defaults during the five year period until 
maturity, the tranche investor receives the premia for the entire period and no insurance 
payments are necessary.  
Tranche premia are very sensitive to the default correlation between the firms in the portfolio 
because this correlation directly influences the distribution of risk in the capital structure.  In 
particular, tranche premia depend on the joint loss distribution of the underlying portfolio and 
given all other parameters the default correlation determines the shape of this distribution. As 
default correlation changes, the corresponding movement in the shape of the joint loss 
distribution is directly transmitted to the relative allocation of portfolio credit risk between 
equity, mezzanine and senior tranches. In the next section, I provide a brief overview of a 
simple pricing model which formalises the links between credit risk correlation and tranche 
premia. The discussion of this model also helps to motivate the selection of explanatory 
factors in my regression analysis. 
B. A Simple Pricing Model 
Valuation of CDS index tranches frequently relies on the asymptotic single factor model of 
credit risk.   The single-factor credit portfolio model represents a parsimonious extension of 
the univariate Merton (1974) model to a multivariate context. In this approach, firm i’s asset 
return at time t is denoted by Xit and it is given by:  
  it it t it it F X H U U     1     (1) 
where 
  ȡit is the correlation of firm i’s asset value with F at time t (ȡit > 0) 
  F t is the systematic risk factor (~ N(0, ı)) 
  İit is the idiosyncratic component (~ N(0, 1) and independent of Ft). 
 This calculation proceeds as follows: Assuming a loss given default of 40 % (which is the market convention), six 
defaults each of which has an exposure of 1/125 % lead to a total loss of 2.88%. This value is therefore just below 
the equity tranche’s upper attachment point of 3%. 






9 For a more detailed discussion see Andersen and Sidenius (2006).12
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In this model, the likelihood of a firm’s default is in part determined by its sensitivity to a single 
common factor, denoted here as F. This common factor can be interpreted as a proxy for the 
state of the business cycle. Hence this approach assumes that firms can default due to 
deterioration in the systematic factor or due to idiosyncratic, i.e. firm-specific shocks. The 
correlation of a firm’s asset value with the systematic factor determines the weight of the 
systematic and idiosyncratic components. This asset value correlation is commonly 
interpreted as the correlation of firms’ credit risk, i.e. the credit risk correlation. In the simplest 
specification, the correlation is constant across firms, which implies that all firms have the 
same sensitivity to the common risk factor. 
The relationship between correlations and individual tranches works as follows. A rise in the 
credit correlation represents a scenario of increasing systematic and therefore decreasing 
firm-specific risk in the credit portfolio. Thus, it can be interpreted as increasing risk of a 
general down-turn in the economy rather than the default of a particular firm or a sector. In 
this scenario, probability mass moves from the centre to the tails of the joint loss distribution 
of the portfolio of the iTraxx and CDX index respectively. These fatter tails of the loss 
distribution imply that the likelihood of the realisation of few as well as many credit events 
increases. Under this scenario, the change in the overall shape of the joint loss distribution 
leads to a decline in the equity premium, because the equity tranche investor is not required 
to make a payment in the absence of credit events. This mechanism explains why market 
participants equal buying an equity tranche to a long position in credit correlation: Rising 
correlation lowers the equity tranche premium and therefore raises the mark-to-market value 
of the investor’s position. As regards the mezzanine segment of the CDO capital structure, 
there is generally no unambiguous effect of the correlation on tranche premia. 
Estimation of the implied correlation from tranche premia essentially requires specifying a 
portfolio credit risk model. Based on this model’s specification of the joint loss distribution, the 
individual tranches can then be priced. For estimating the implied correlation, the reverse 
approach is used: In an iterative procedure, correlation is adjusted until the calculated 
premium from the model equals the market quote for the specific tranche.  
Among traders of CDS index tranches there is a modelling convention similar to options 
to link implied volatilities to option price quotes. Given that all other input parameters are 
already known, equity index options can be traded through the ‘metric’ of implied volatilities. 
Analogously, CDS index tranches are traded through the ‘metric’ of the implied credit 
correlation. To extract this parameter from tranche prices, market participants use a one-
factor portfolio credit risk model, namely the Gaussian copula model. By means of this 
procedure, market participants’ forecasts of average pair-wise credit correlation can be 
 This result follows from the general characteristics of the joint loss distribution and does not depend on the market 
environment. 
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‘implied’ from the tranche premia (see Isla and Willemann, 2007 for more details on this 
methodology). 
In sum, the main components of a CDO pricing model are a specification of the firm-level 
default process, the default comovement and assumptions about the dynamics of the risk-free 
rate. In addition, a specification for risk premia (see e.g. the CDO pricing model proposed by 
Eckner, 2007) and a proxy for market liquidity risk might be needed to capture supply / 
demand imbalances.  
C. The Time Series of Tranche Premia since 2004 
A snapshot of the iTraxx tranche premia for the last day of my sample, (January 29, 2008), is 
shown in table 1.   For the purpose of comparison, I show the level of tranche premia on 
January 23, 2007. All tranche premia are expressed in basis points. This premium is the 
amount which the investor in a specific tranche (i.e. the protection seller) receives from the 
protection buyer as a compensation for covering the losses tied to that tranche. 
There are large differences in individual tranche premia due to the differences in their inherent 
sensitivity to portfolio credit risk. The tranche providing exposure to the 12% to 22 % segment 
of the loss distribution paid 59.5 BP annually on January 29, 2008; the 9-12% tranche paid 
117 BP and the equity tranche 1243 BP. Thus, for taking on the first loss piece of the capital 
structure of the default insurance for the iTraxx portfolio, the equity holder would be 
compensated with an expected annual payment of around 12.5 % of his notional amount.  
Another perspective on the capital structure is that the CDS index portfolio with an annual 
premium of around 70 BP generates six new instruments, with premia ranging from 19.5 BP 
(22-100 % tranche) to 1243 BP (0-3 % tranche). This variety of payoffs illustrates how CDOs 
extend the range of available fixed income products by offering a broad range of risk - return 
profiles. However, the new instruments also have rather specific risk profiles. In particular, 
senior tranches are exposed to sizable “tail risk”, i.e. the risk of very infrequent but 
catastrophic losses. As Coval et al. (2007) show, tail risk is a significant factor in the 
theoretical valuation of CDX tranches already before the start of the credit market turmoil. 
Coval et al. (2007) also argue that tranche investors were not aware of the extent of their 
exposure to tail risk. 
After credit traders started their reassessment of the pricing of credit risk in the summer of 
2007, investment grade premia jumped upwards over a short period of time, leading to large 
mark-to-market losses. All tranche premia widened significantly, although the degree of 
change differed across the capital structure. Table 1 shows that from January, 23 2007 to 
January, 29 2008 the equity tranche premium rose from 750 BP to 1243 BP whereas the 
premium on the 12-22 % tranche rose from 2.25 BP to around 60 BP. A similarly sharp 
 Given the high degree of riskiness, the investor in the equity tranche receives an upfront premium as well as a 
running premium. For the purpose of comparability, these two equity-specific premia are converted to a regular 
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increase is also observed for the 22-100 % tranche where the premium increased from 
around 1 BP to around 20 BP. This latter case shows the intensity of the repricing of the 
super-senior tranches which were perceived to be almost free of default risk before August 
2007. Furthermore, the premium of 1 BP for the 22-100% tranche also explains the popularity 
of ”Leveraged Super Senior” trading strategies where high expected returns were not 
generated by investing in risky assets but rather by taking a supposedly low-risk tranche and 
leveraging it up to obtain higher returns. 
All in all, the movements in tranche premia imply that tranche investors became seriously 
concerned about losses hitting even the higher components of the capital structure of the 
iTraxx index tranches. Hence the pattern of price changes in the less risky parts of the CDO 
capital structure over the last year can be interpreted as a reassessment of the weight of 
large, low-probability loss events. A similar finding is obtained by Bhansali et al (2008) in a 
three-factor credit portfolio model for CDS index tranches. 
Graph 1 shows the development of the iTraxx and CDX index and the associated tranches 
with a maturity of five years since summer 2004. Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for 
levels of the premia for the tranches. As the data for the CDX 30-100 % tranche only start in 
February 2005, this series has a much lower number of observations than the other 
tranches.  
In the sample period, the average CDS index premium equals 36 basis points for the iTraxx 
and 51 BP for the CDX. Thus, it costs around EUR 36.000 annually to obtain insurance for a 
portfolio of EUR 10 million of European investment grade corporate debt. The majority of 
firms in the iTraxx or CDX index have a credit rating between A and BBB. Because average 
credit quality is situated in the lower investment grade range the level of the CDS premium on 
the index portfolio is therefore similar to the CDS premium of an individual firm which is rated 
between A to BBB.  
For both indices, the lowest premia were observed in May 2006 (with around 25 basis points 
for the iTraxx) and the highest during the turbulence which started in summer 2007 (with 82 
basis points for the iTraxx in January 2008). A first peak in premia is observed for May 2005, 
when S & P’s downgrade of Ford and General Motors from BBB to BB led to substantial 
turbulences in the credit market. In particular, CDS premia experienced a sharp but temporary 
rise. This market turmoil which represented the first period of stress since the use of credit 
derivatives became widespread had an adverse impact on the functioning of the credit 
derivatives market, reportedly causing large losses among some hedge funds. 
Overall, a decline in premia until to spring 2007 can be observed. One of the main factors 
behind the decline in premia was a benign macroeconomic environment, combined with low 
equity market volatility and strong demand for higher yielding assets. This “hunt for yield” had 
started in the aftermath of the collapse of the overvaluation in new-economy stocks (see 
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chapter VI in BIS (2004) for a discussion). The search for higher yielding assets manifested 
itself in many asset classes. In the credit market, this demand pressure together with the low 
equity market volatility and low number of actual defaults contributed to a sharp decline in 
credit spreads, which is clearly visible in the majority of series plotted in graph 1. For instance, 
in summer 2004, the premium for the iTraxx 6-9% tranche was around 60 basis points, 
whereas in summer 2006 it was below 20 basis points.  
Turning to the May 2005 episode, the rapid increase in premia is particularly distinct for the 
two equity tranches.  The background to this episode is that many credit investors traded 
equity vs. mezzanine tranches by buying protection on the former and selling it on the latter. 
The sudden decline in the correlation forced traders to rebalance their relative-value positions. 
This renewed pressure then may have prolonged the turbulence.  
The turbulence in summer 2007 which dominates the last part of the time series plots was 
caused by strongly rising delinquencies in US sub-prime mortgage markets. Market 
participants then became increasingly concerned about the valuation of all portfolio credit risk 
transfer instruments, even those without subprime assets in the portfolio. Mark-to-market as 
well as mark-to-model valuations and also the risk assessments of rating agencies were all 
called into question, leading to a collapse in primary credit markets. The corresponding 
general repricing of credit risk manifested itself in rising credit spreads in many segments of 
the credit market.  
During this episode of market volatility, investors with exposure to the investment grade 
segment also experienced heavy mark to market losses as premia jumped upwards in a short 
period of time. For instance, the iTraxx 5-year index rose from 26 BP at the beginning of July 
to 58 BP in the middle of August. Tranche premia also widened, although the degree of 
change differed across the capital structure. For example from July 2 2007 to August 8 2007, 
the equity tranche premium rose by 52 % whereas the premium on the 12 – 22% tranche 
increased by around 150 %. This movement implies that investors became seriously 
concerned about losses hitting also the higher components of the capital structure of the 
iTraxx index tranches. 
As graph 1 illustrates, the market turmoil which started in July 2007 proceeded in several 
phases. The first phase in summer 2007 was characterised by a sharp upward move in CDS 
premia as the fall in the prices of subprime assets spilled over into other segments of the 
credit markets. After this first correction, a second phase saw declining risk aversion and 
correspondingly some small declines in credit spreads. For instance, at the end of September 
2007, the iTraxx index had moved below 40 BP after having reached a level of 65 BP at the 
end of July. Finally, more negative news from monoline insurers as well as from a number of 
major banks launched another round of strong repricing which started in December 2007 and 
 According to Longstaff and Rajan (2008), overall market pricing of the CDX tranches is efficient in the sense that 
estimates for the unobserved firm-specific, industry-wide and economy-wide, i.e. systematic credit risk factors 
together account for a large fraction of tranche premia. The study also finds that even during the market turbulence in 
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continued right until the end of my sample on January, 29 2008. In this third phase, the iTraxx 
index reached a sample period high of 82 BP on January 23, 2008. 
A comparison of the European and North American tranche datasets shows that the 
US$ premia mostly exceed the euro premia. As regards the index levels, the average CDX 
premium is 51 BP whereas for the iTraxx index it is only 36.9 BP. This difference in the index 
levels carries over into differences between the tranche premia. Except for the most senior 
tranche, the CDX tranche premia exceed those of iTraxx tranches with comparable 
attachment points. For example, the average equity premium amounts to 1400 BP for the 
CDX portfolio whereas in the case of the iTraxx it is only around 1000 BP. In both markets, 
May 2005, August 2007 and January 2008 provided clear peaks in the premia. Furthermore, 
the decline in premia from 2005 to spring 2007 occurred in both regions. 
D. Descriptive Statistics of Changes in log Premia 
Given that no study has provided a comparison of the statistical properties of the two sets of 
tranche premia, table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the log changes.  
Median changes are zero, indicating some “stickiness” in market prices of the tranches as 
well as the index. Standard deviations vary across tranches without clear patterns. Despite its 
high degree of riskiness the premium for the equity tranche is less volatile than the premia of 
the tranches with higher subordination in the capital structure. For example, in the case of the 
iTraxx data set, the changes of the log 22 – 100 % tranche premium show a standard 
deviation of 0.09 whereas the standard deviation of the equity tranche is only 0.03. 
I confirm the validity of a stylised fact for the time series of asset prices . This stylised fact is 
the non-normality of the unconditional distribution of returns. The tests for ten third and fourth 
moments of the unconditional distribution indicate significant asymmetry and leptokurtosis. 
Hence, I observe a clear departure from normality. The distribution is skewed to the right for 
all series except the CDX 30-100 % tranche. Therefore, the sample period contains more 
positive than negative daily changes. The kurtosis in the iTraxx index exceeds the values 
estimated for the CDX index. Therefore, the mass in the tails of the euro index premium is 
bigger than in the US premium. 
II. Empirical Results 
A. Regression Methodology 
The starting point for the selection of market-based factors is provided by the CDO pricing 
model which I outlined earlier. I include factors which serve as inputs in pricing models, 
namely proxies for credit risk and for the movement of the risk-free rate. In addition, I include 
some factors, which previous research has found to be significant determinants of credit 
spreads.   
 Andreou et al. (2001) provide a detailed survey on the statistical properties of financial time series. 
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x  The CDS index premium 
The level of the CDS index determines the expected loss and hence the central tendency of 
the joint loss distribution. Therefore, I include the changes of the log of the iTraxx and CDX 
index time series. 
x  The credit risk correlation 
The credit risk correlation determines the shape of the joint loss distribution of the CDS index 
portfolio. As discussed earlier, tranche premia are very sensitive to the credit correlation 
between the firms in the portfolio because this correlation directly influences the distribution of 
risk across the tranches. 
I use the implied base correlation of the equity tranche to measure credit risk correlation. This 
measure is the simplest estimate of the homogeneous asset value correlation in the index 
portfolio. Furthermore, as outlined above, the implied correlation is also the market standard 
for expressing default comovement in CDO portfolios (see e.g. Isla and Willemann 2007). To 
avoid potential endogeneity problems, I use the lagged change of the log correlation. 
x  The risk-free rate 
Changes in the risk free rate in general are negatively related to credit spreads and I assume 
that the same linkage also holds for tranche premia. The theoretical explanation within the 
Merton (1974) framework proceeds as follows: First, a rising risk-free rate decreases the 
present value of the expected future cash flows, i.e. the price of the put option decreases. 
Second, a rising risk-free rate tends to raise the expected growth rate of the firm value and 
hence a higher firm value becomes more likely. In turn, this implies a lower price of the put 
option on the firm value. Hence both effects decrease the costs of insurance against default, 
which implies a lower credit spread.  
For both markets, I use the five-year swap rate because interest rate swaps are commonly 
seen as the market participants’ preferred measure of the risk-free rate (cf. Longstaff et al., 
2005).  
x  The slope of the term structure 
In the Longstaff and Schwarz (1995) structural credit risk model with stochastic interest rates, 
a rising slope of the term structure lowers credit spreads. In this model, in the long run, the 
short rate converges to the long rate. Hence an increasing slope of the term structure should 
lead to an increase in the expected future spot rate. This in turn, will decrease credit spreads 
through its effect on the drift of the asset value process. I assume that a similar effect may 
hold for tranche premia and I define the slope of the term structure as the difference between 
the ten-year and the one-year euro and US$ swap rates.  
x Risk  aversion 18
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As Eckner (2007) shows, tranche premia not only compensate tranche investors for pure 
expected loss but also for jump risk. Hence, tranche premia may change due to changes in 
investors’ risk aversion even if the underlying fundamentals (i.e. the pricing under the 
“statistical measure”) are unchanged.  
For both the US and Europe I use the JP Morgan G-10 Risk aversion index. This index 
aggregates implied volatilities and measures for flight to quality into a single measure of the 
market participants’ risk appetite. Coudert and Gex (2008) discuss various measures of risk 
aversion and show that these indicators are good leading indicators of sharp declines in stock 
prices. 
x Swap  spread 
As a proxy for the liquidity risk premium in financial markets I use the swap spread, i.e. the 
yield differential between a ten-year interest rate swap and a US / German government bond 
with similar maturity. The swap spread contains information about the liquidity risk premium, 
because it is affected by the funding operations of banks in the inter-bank market (cf. Huang 
and Neftci, 2003). Furthermore, Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) show that collateralized 
interest rate swaps, which have been increasingly used in the last few years are free of 
counterparty default risk. 
x Bid–ask  spread 
Tang and Yan (2006) show that the bid–ask spread is significantly positively related to CDS 
premia. Hence to measure the effects of market liquidity on CDS index tranches I include the 
average bid-ask spread across all six tranches. This variable should reflect common patterns 
in the market liquidity of the tranches rather than liquidity shocks affecting only a single 
tranche. 
x  Yen exchange rate 
In recent years, many market participants used a trading strategy where they borrowed in a 
low-interest rate currency and invested the proceeds from the loan in higher-yielding assets 
(cf. Gagnon and Chaboud, 2007). In many of these “carry trades” a short position in the yen 
was used to finance positions in currencies with high interest rates. Thus, movements in the 
Yen exchange rate may affect tranche premia through their effects on the cost of financing. 
For the euro area, I use the Yen-Euro rate and the Yen-US$ for the US.  
Graph 2 plots the time series of the levels of the explanatory variables for the iTraxx tranches. 
All factors show a sharp change from summer 2007 onward. Base correlation went from .2 in 
2004 to .4 at the end of the sample, illustrating the market perception of rising systematic as 
opposed to idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, a sharp upward movement in the bid-ask spread 
started in summer 2007, indicating potential liquidity problems in the tranche market. 
Comparing the May 2005 episode with the subprime-related turmoil, the graph illustrates a 19
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temporary increase for the bid-ask spread whereas the swap spread then showed a weaker 
reaction.  
Table 4 summarises the eight explanatory variables and the corresponding signs that I expect 
for the respective estimates of the parameters. The effects of the factors are evaluated by 
means of a standard regression approach using the change in the log tranche premia as the 
dependent variable.  
My baseline specification is therefore given by 
' log Yit = C + E0 ' log Indext +E1 ' log Correlationt-1 + E2 ' Swap ratet + E3 ' Slopet + E4 '
Risk aversion t  + E5 ' Swap spread 10t + E6 ' log Bid-Askt + E7 'log (Yent) + Ht   (2) 
with Yit representing the premium on tranche i (with i = 0-3%, … , 22 - 100% for iTraxx and 0-
3%, … , 30% - 100% for CDX) at time t.  
Given the specification above, I use OLS as an estimation method. Heterogeneity across 
tranches and the dimensions of the data set (six time series with around 1000 observations 
each) makes a panel approach less advantageous than OLS. Furthermore, the simple 
valuation model outlined earlier implies that the effect of the correlation proxy should vary in 
the crossection because individual tranches have different sensitivities to changes in the 
correlation. In addition, it is conceivable that the proxy for risk aversion may have different 
effects depending on how risky a specific tranche is.  
Due to the fact that the errors are most likely quite highly correlated across tranches, 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is a plausible alternative specification. However, 
applying SUR to the equation system specified above is identical to using OLS on each 
equation. The reason for this identity between the two estimators is that in the case of 
identical right hand side variables (which is valid here), SUR and OLS produce identical 
estimators.  All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors to account for 
the heteroscedasticity in changes of log tranche premia. 
B. Overall results 
In order to analyse the fit of the above model for my sample, I estimate the baseline 
regression as given in equation (2) for the entire sample period. Table 5 shows the 
multivariate regressions together with the adjusted R². From the multivariate regression 
analysis, several results are notable.  
First, the underlying CDS index has a significant impact (at 10%) on the variation of all 
tranche premia except the CDX 30 - 100% tranche. As hypothesised in table 4, the change in 
the index CDS premium enters the equations with a positive coefficient. Therefore, a rise in 
this proxy for the expected loss in the underlying CDS portfolio raises the tranche premia. In 
the iTraxx sample, the coefficient on the index change clearly increases with the 
16
 For a proof see Greene 1993, p. 488.
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subordination. Furthermore, the significance of the effect differs between the US and the EU 
data set: The t-statistics of the coefficients on the CDS index change of the iTraxx tranches 
exceed those estimated for the CDX tranches. 
Second, the proxy for the credit risk correlation is significant only in a minority of tranche 
regressions. At the 5% level there is a significant relation for the 30-100% CDX tranche and 
for the 0-3 % iTraxx tranche. The sign of the coefficient is negative for the first five CDX 
tranches and all iTraxx tranches. Hence, the relation between CDX tranche premia indeed 
depends on the subordination of the respective tranche whereas this is not the case for the 
iTraxx tranches. 
Third, the five-year swap rate (with the exception of the CDX 7-10% tranche), the slope of the 
swap curve and the yen exchange rate do not have significant effects on tranche premia.  
Fourth, the risk aversion proxy has strong positive effects for all CDX tranches but not for the 
iTraxx tranches, where there is only a weak impact on the pricing of the equity tranche (with a 
t-statistic of only 1.32). 
Fifth, there are significant liquidity effects in tranche premia at the 10% significance level. The 
coefficient on the average bid-ask spread is significant for all except the iTraxx 6-9% and the 
CDX 30-100 % tranches. The swap spread has significantly positive effects for the iTraxx 
tranches and the CDX 7 -10 % tranche.  
Sixth, the R² values of the iTraxx data set all exceed those of the CDX dataset. The difference 
between the two data sets is particularly large for the higher tranches such as the two most 
senior tranches, where the R² for the iTraxx amounts to 0.21 and to 0.04 for the CDX. A 
strong difference is also observed for the iTraxx 12 – 22% with an R² of 0.38 and the CDX 15 
– 30% tranche an R² of 0.21. Hence, residual variation in CDX tranche premia is bigger than 
in the iTraxx tranches.  
Seventh, the variation of the CDX 30-100 % tranche is highly idiosyncratic and differs 
substantially from that observed for the other tranches. Furthermore, the CDX super-senior 
tranche, which would only be affected by a wave of large-scale corporate defaults among 
CDX member firms does not react to the factor set in a manner similar to the iTraxx 22-100% 
super-senior tranche. This is also the only CDX tranche where credit risk proxies or liquidity 
proxies do not significantly contribute to explaining the time variation of changes in log premia.  
Turning to the economic significance of the results, I compare the reaction of the tranche 
premia to one-standard-deviation changes in the set of explanatory variables. Graph 3 shows 
the impact of a change of one standard deviation of the explanatory factors in terms of the 
standard deviation of the dependent variables, i.e. the changes in log tranche premia. For 
reasons of space this graph omits the two super - senior tranches in each market. 
As can be seen from graph 3, a change of one standard deviation in the CDS index results in 
a change of around 50% of a standard deviation of iTraxx tranche premia changes. After the 
iTraxx CDS index, the variable with the biggest impact in terms of changes in standard 21
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deviation is the base correlation. This effect grows with increasing subordination with the 
exception of the 3-6% and the 9-12% tranches. Finally, the bid-ask spread achieves an 
impact of around 15 % of the standard deviation of the two most senior iTraxx tranches.  
In contrast to the iTraxx data set, the bid-ask spread achieves the highest effect on the 
standard deviation of the tranche premia, ranging up to 45% in the case of the CDX 7-10% 
tranche. Taking the effect on the dependent variable as a criterion, the second most important 
variable is the risk aversion measure. These results again illustrate the differences in the 
pricing of the two contracts. In particular, liquidity and risk aversion plays a larger role in the 
CDX than in the iTraxx tranches. 
All in all, the simple regression model shows that the iTraxx and the CDX data sets differ with 
respect to the determinants of the tranche premia. This difference is strongest for the most 
senior tranches. However, the signs of the significant relations in both the iTraxx and CDX 
data sets are in accordance with my hypothesis: A rise in the expected loss measure or the 
liquidity proxy lead to a positive change in log tranche premia. In the next subsection, I 
analyse the effects of the subprime turmoil on the regression results. 
C. The impact of the subprime turmoil 
Given the sizable impact of the repricing of subprime debt instruments on other segments of 
the credit markets, I now study how the determinants of tranche premia have changed after 
July 2007. As I noted in section I, tranche premia widened considerably, with the degree of 
change differing across the capital structure. The strongest increase - in percentage terms - 
was observed for the senior and super-senior tranches. In the framework of the one-factor 
model discussed earlier, this crossectional pattern indicates a market perception of rising 
systematic and declining firm-specific credit risk. 
To analyse the effect of the events starting in summer 2007, I reestimate the specification 
defined in equation (2) with a time dummy for each explanatory variable:  
' log Yit = C + E0 ' log Indext +E1 ' log Correlationt-1+ E2 ' Swap ratet + E3 ' Slopet
 +  E4 ' Risk aversion t  + E5 ' Swap spread 10t + E6 ' log Bid-Askt + E7 'log (Yent) + 
E8 ȟ2007 log Indext+ E9 ȟ2007 ' log Correlationt-1 + E10 ȟ2007 ' Swap ratet +    
E11 ȟ2007 ' Slopet + E12 ȟ2007 ' Risk aversion t  + E13 ȟ2007 ' Swap spread 10t +  
E14 ȟ2007 ' log Bid-Askt + E15 ȟ2007 'log (Yent)+ Ht   (3) 
with Yit representing the premium on tranche i (with i = 0-3%, … , 22 - 100% for iTraxx and 0-
3%, … , 30% - 100% for CDX) at time t and ȟ2007 representing a dummy variable taking the 
value one from July 2, 2007 onwards. This specification allows me to isolate the effects of the 
turmoil on the linkage between specific explanatory factors and the changes in the log tranche 
premia. The estimation results of this extended specification are shown in table 6. A caveat in 
the interpretation of my approach is that the subprime turmoil proceeded in three periods of 
first rising, then falling and then rising credit spreads. This heterogeneity in the intensity of the 
repricing of credit risk is not captured by the time dummy. 22
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Overall, the extended specification with the interaction dummy has stronger effects on the 
CDX tranches than on the iTraxx tranches. For the iTraxx data set, the main impact of the 
interaction dummy is to uncover a linkage between swap rate changes and changes in log 
tranche premia. In particular, the inclusion of the turmoil interaction dummy leads to a 
significantly positive effect of the change in the swap rate on the change in the log premium 
for all iTraxx tranches except the most senior tranche. Hence, since July 2007, an increase in 
the swap rate has raised iTraxx tranche premia. The swap rate also appears to capture some 
liquidity effects as the liquidity proxies become insignificant for the 3-6% and the 6-9% iTraxx 
tranches.  
For the CDX tranches, the turmoil interaction dummy strengthens the positive impact of the 
bid - ask spread. This result suggests that CDX tranches became even more illiquid since 
July 2007. In addition there are three significantly negative coefficients on the coefficients 
where the underlying index is multiplied with the interaction dummy. Hence, the linkage 
between the tranches and the underlying CDX index weakened since July 2007. Another 
notable result is the impact of the interaction dummy on the relation between CDX tranche 
premia and risk aversion. In particular, for the 0-3 % CDX tranche, the two coefficients on the 
risk aversion measure have the same size but opposite signs. Given that the risk aversion 
proxy does not show a clear time series trend (see also graph 2), this result could be due to a 
potential loss of information in a specification where all variables are in first differences. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that in a regression in levels, tranche premia show a 
strong positive reaction to the risk aversion measure. 
The regression results also demonstrate that investors in CDX tranches reacted more 
strongly to the market turmoil than investors in iTraxx tranches. In particular, a comparison of 
the results of the simple model in table 4 to the extended model in table 6 shows that the 
explanatory power of my factor set rises after accounting for the onset of the subprime turmoil. 
This increase is stronger for the CDX tranches than for the iTraxx tranches. For example, the 
CDX 30-100 % tranche now achieves an adjusted- R² of 0.11 compared to only 0.04 for the 
specification without time dummies and the R-squared of the extended regressions for the 
five lower CDX tranches now exceed 0.4. In the iTraxx data set, the biggest increase is 
observed for the 12-22% tranche, where the R² moves by a relatively much smaller amount, 
namely from 0.36 to 0.41. These differences in the impact of the turmoil dummy in the iTraxx 
and CDX regression estimates also confirm the earlier finding that tranche investors price the 
US$ and the euro tranches differently. 
I now examine how much of the time variation of tranche premia is explained by changes in 
credit risk compared to changes in interest rates, risk aversion or liquidity risk. Specifically, I 
define the four categories of explanatory variables as follows: Credit Risk (Index and 
correlation), Interest Rate Factors (level and slope), Risk Aversion (JP Morgan index) and 
Liquidity Risk (swap spread, bid-ask, Yen). Hence, I analyse which factor categories have the 
highest explanatory power for tranche premia. For this purpose, I estimate four regressions of 23
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these four factor categories on the first differences of the log tranche premia. Graph 4 shows 
the R²s of the four regressions for the iTraxx and CDX tranches. The two sample periods are 
defined as August 2004 to July 2007 (‘before’) and July 2007 to January 2008 (‘after’) 
respectively. 
For both the iTraxx and CDX tranches, the largest R²s are recorded for the credit risk and the 
liquidity group. The graph also confirms the difference between the R² values of the European 
and the North American data sets. The credit risk proxies achieve R²s of more than 25% for 
all iTraxx tranches whereas for the CDX most values are below 15% (in the case of the CDX 
30-100% tranche, credit risk accounts for more than half of the entire explanatory value, but in 
absolute terms, the R-squared coefficient is only .03). Furthermore, the contribution of the risk 
aversion proxy is bigger in the CDX data set than in the iTraxx data set. In contrast, the three 
liquidity proxies achieve similar values in the two sets of tranche premia.  
The graph clearly shows the shift in the relative explanatory power among the four categories 
since summer 2007. Risk aversion (as captured by the JP Morgan index) and liquidity risk 
have increased their weights whereas the role of credit risk has declined in relative terms. For 
example, in the case of the 6-9% iTraxx tranche, credit risk accounted for more than 60 % 
before the turmoil and for less than 40 % after the start of the turmoil. Simultaneously, the 
contribution of risk aversion changed from less than 20% to more than 30 %. This shift is valid 
for all tranches of both the CDX and the iTraxx index. 
To examine further how the individual explanatory power of risk aversion and liquidity risk has 
changed over time, I estimate rolling bivariate correlations based on a moving window of 120 
daily observations.  This approach also allows me to compare the determinants in the high-
volatility episode of May 2005 to the situation after July 2007. Results for the iTraxx are given 
in graph 5 (results for the CDX index are very similar and omitted for reasons of space).  
Across all iTraxx tranches, there is a sharp increase in the linkages between risk aversion, 
liquidity risk and the tranche premia since summer 2007. In relative terms, the impact of risk 
aversion on tranche premia has risen by more than the impact of liquidity risk on tranche 
premia. This difference between risk aversion and liquidity risk is observed for all tranches. 
Among the five iTraxx tranches, the 12-22% tranche shows the strongest correlation with the 
bid-ask spread and the 6-9% tranche has the strongest correlation with the risk aversion 
proxy. Furthermore, the impact of market liquidity has seen a slight decline in the last weeks 
of the sample period.  
Graph 5 also shows that the relationships observed since summer 2007 up to the end of my 
sample differ from those observed during the market turmoil in May 2005. In particular, the 
role of the risk aversion component now exceeds that observed in 2005. 
In sum, these findings imply that declining risk appetite and heightened concerns about 
market liquidity, which investors have shown since summer 2007, have provided a sizable 
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contribution to the observed strong increase in tranche premia. Furthermore, tranche 
investors have revised their valuation of the CDX contracts more substantially than their 
valuation of the iTraxx contracts.  
These finding can be interpreted in the context of the development of the credit market turmoil 
and its macroeconomic impact. Given its roots in the US housing market, the turmoil started 
in US credit markets before affecting financial markets globally. Its adverse effects so far have 
been stronger for the US macroeconomic outlook rather than on the growth in the euro area. 
Market participants perceive the likelihood of a recession to be much higher in the US than in 
Europe. Therefore, the effects on the pool of CDX firms may be more homogeneous than in 
the case of the iTraxx firms. In the latter case, the subprime turmoil has had particularly 
strong effects on the pricing of the 25 financial firms , whereas the other 100 firms in the 
index are affected to a comparatively smaller extent also due to the still benign 
macroeconomic environment.
19  
D. Further Results and Robustness Tests 
If the regressions are well-specified, then the residuals should show weak contemporaneous 
correlation, because the common factors are already accounted for by the explanatory factors. 
Therefore, the residuals are a proxy for the idiosyncratic component, which is not captured by 
the set of common explanatory variables. Table 7 compares the first two principal 
components of the changes in the log tranche premia (based on their contributions to the 
variance decomposition) and the residuals from the regressions shown in table 5.  
This analysis shows that the correlations between the residuals are only fractionally smaller 
than those between the dependent variables. This pronounced interdependence in the 
residuals indicates the presence of a large unobserved common component, which is not 
reproduced by the regression approach. 
A similar result is documented by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for US corporate bonds. They 
show that the residuals from regressions on the spreads of individual bonds are heavily 
correlated. Their interpretation is that US corporate bond markets are segmented from stock 
and Treasury markets and driven by large supply/demand shocks. This interpretation could 
also be applied to CDS index tranches. Given that the market has only been active for four 
years, supply – demand imbalances and technical factors, which are not captured by the 
liquidity proxies in the equations, may be present. In addition, the market may exhibit 
“clientele” effects, i.e. demand may differ across tranches due to investors’ risk appetite. 
Similar clientele effects based on heterogeneous investors have also been observed in other 
iTraxx series 7 started trading in March 2007 with the following financials: ABN Amro, Aegon, Allianz, Assicurazioni 
Generali, Aviva, AXA, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare Italiana, BBVA, BCP, Banco Espirito Santo, 
BSCH, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Capitalia, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Hannover Rueck, Intesa Sanpaolo, 
Muenchener Rueck, Royal & Sun Alliance, Swiss Re, RBS, Unicredit, Zurich Insurance. 
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segments of the credit market, e.g. the commercial paper market (cf. Covitz and Downing, 
2007). 
I confirm the robustness of my findings by means of three additional tests.  First, I include 
non-linear effects in the regression by means of squaring the explanatory variables. This has 
no major impact on the regression results. One of the few additional significant coefficients in 
the CDX estimations is the square and the cube of the change in the log CDX index. As these 
variables can be interpreted as measures of index volatility and skewness, the specification 
allowing for nonlinear effects indicates that the higher moments of the CDS index distribution 
may also affect tranche premia. For the iTraxx tranches, the squared swap spread is 
significantly positive in all six equations, indicating that higher spread volatility raises iTraxx 
tranche premia. As a second robustness test, I use lagged rather than contemporaneous 
independent variables. Again, this modified specification does not change overall results. For 
example, the lagged iTraxx index significantly affects tranche premia whereas the same effect 
is again weaker in the US dataset. My third robustness test is to replace the JP Morgan index 
of risk aversion by the Westpac RAI Index. Again results are unchanged. 
III. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the determinants of the daily movement in CDS index tranche 
premia. By means of regression analysis I estimated the reaction of the market prices of CDS 
index tranches to market-based proxies for credit risk, liquidity risk, risk aversion and interest 
rate risk. 
My main result is that there are sizable differences in the market pricing of CDX and iTraxx 
tranches. In particular, the European tranche premia show a weaker reaction to the onset of 
the turmoil than the US tranche premia. Credit risk proxies and liquidity proxies are priced in 
all iTraxx and almost all CDX tranches. Furthermore, the explanatory power of my factor set 
rises after the onset of the subprime turmoil with the increase being stronger in the CDX 
tranches than in the iTraxx tranches. However, although tranche premia are significantly 
related to a number of explanatory variables, they still contain a strong common unobservable 
component.  
The methodology in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In particular, the 
scope of the CDS index can be extended in the dimensions of maturity and credit risk, i.e. 
towards longer maturities and towards the High Yield or the Subprime segment. In particular, 
the latter index category, which is represented by the iTraxx Crossover, the CDX High Yield 
or the ABX subprime index may be an interesting sample as the developments in the 
subprime crisis illustrate. As regards the econometric approach, a Generalised Method of 
Moments model could be used to capture the crossectional correlation across tranche premia 
as well as the heteroscedasticity and non-normality in the time series dimension.
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Table 1: Tranche premia for iTraxx Europe Main 5Y on January, 29 2008 and 
January, 23 2007 
This table reports the CDS premia for the iTraxx Europe Main five-year investment grade index and the 
corresponding tranches on the last day of the sample and on 23/1/2007. The rating estimates are taken 
from Calamero et al. (2004).










Equity 0-3  NA  750  1243.75 
Junior Mezzanine  3-6  BBB  40  294 
Mezzanine 6-9  AAA  12  188 
Senior 1  9-12  AAA  6  117.5 
Senior 2  12-22  AAA  2.25  59.5 
Super senior  22-100  AAA  0.95  70.5 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of CDS index and tranche premia 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the levels of the tranche premia and the CDS index. The 
sample is August 2004 to January 2008. N represents the number of observations. 
 
 CDX  iTraxx 
Mean 51.05 36.86 
Median 48.00  36.00 
Maximum 118.50  82.00 
Minimum 28.88  20.13 
Std. Dev.  14.16  10.23 
N 1064  1063 
   
   
 
 
0-3 %  3-7 %  7-10 %  10-15 %  15-30 %  30-100 % 
Mean 1407.87  186.68  60.91 27.04  11.11    5.23 
Median 1426.56 142.25  42.00  20.25  8.38    3.04 
Maximum 2068.75  576.00  271.00  124.00  69.50    34.15 
Minimum 928.13  57.75  10.00  4.00  1.75    0.00 
Std. Dev.  222.90  109.90  48.38  21.62  9.79   5.57 
N 1064  1064  1064  1064  1064 792 
         
         
0-3%  3-6 %  6-9 %  9-12 %  12-22%  22-100% 
Mean 1064.96  117.62  44.61 25.25  12.44    4.29 
Median 1090.63  92.00  31.00  15.03  9.20    3.00 
Maximum 1732.05  420.00  250.00  152.50  79.00    26.00 
Minimum 643.75  39.00  10.25  4.50  1.75    0.65 
Std. Dev.  187.38  68.72  35.61  22.06  11.09   4.30 
N 1063  1063  1063  1063  1063 943 30
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of first differences of log CDS index and log tranche 
premia 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the first differences of the log tranche premia and the CDS 
index. The sample is August 2004 to January 2008. 
  CDX iTraxx 
Mean 0.00  0.00 
Median 0.00  0.00 
Maximum 0.19  0.24 
Minimum -0.20  -0.25 
Std. Dev.  0.03  0.03 
Skewness 0.68  0.52 




CDX 0-3 %  3-7 %  7-10 %  10-15 %  15-30 %  30-100 % 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00 
Median 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00 
Maximum 0.12  0.35  0.46  0.51  0.70    2.47 
Minimum -0.11  -0.35  -0.41  -0.41  -0.76  -2.47 
Std. Dev.  0.02  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09   0.21 
Skewness 0.40  0.18  0.54  0.38  0.80  -0.22 
Kurtosis 8.98 10.35 11.17  10.52  20.68    62.26 
          
          
iTraxx 0-3%  3-6 %  6-9 %  9-12 %  12-22%  22-100% 
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00 
Median 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00 
Maximum 0.16  0.41  0.59  0.69  0.76    0.71 
Minimum -0.15  -0.37  -0.45  -0.45  -0.62  -0.49 
Std. Dev.  0.03  0.07  0.08  0.09  0.09   0.10 
Skewness 0.64  0.63  0.86  0.97  0.87    0.77 
Kurtosis 9.79 11.29 12.08  13.09  16.16    9.65 31
ECB






Table 4: Description of explanatory variables and expected signs for parameter 
estimates 
This table reports the variables used in the regressions where the dependent variable is the change in 
the log tranche premium. The data sources are Bloomberg and JP Morgan. The specification is defined 
as follows:  
' log Yit = C + E0 ' log Indext +E1 ' log Correlationt-1 +  E2 ' Swap ratet + E3 ' Slopet + E4 ' 
Risk aversion t  + E5 ' Swap spread 10t + E6 ' log Bid-Askt + E7 'log (Yent) + Ht   with  Yit 
representing the premium on tranche i (with i = 0-3%, … , 22 - 100% for iTraxx and 0-3%, … , 30% - 
100% for CDX) at time t. 
 
 Notation  Definition  Sign 
Credit risk  Index  Index CDS (CDX / iTraxx )   (+) 
  Correlation  Base correlation of iTraxx / CDX equity tranches   (+/-) 
Interest rate factors Swap rate  Euro / US$5 Y swap rate  (-) 
  Slope  10 Y – 1 Y US$ / Euro swap rate  (-) 
Risk aversion  Risk aversion JP Morgan risk aversion index  (+) 
Liquidity proxies  Swap spread  10 Y US$ / Euro swap spread  (+) 
  Bid-ask  Yen – US$ / Euro  (+) 
  Yen  Bid-ask spread of CDX / iTraxx tranches  (+) 32
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Table 5a: Regression results of changes in log CDX tranche premia on all factors 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of daily changes in the log CDX tranche premia on 
the variables listed in table 4. The adjusted R-square is denoted R² and t-statistics based on 
Newey-West standard errors are given adjacent to the coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked in 
bold are significant at 5 %. The sample is August 2004 to January 2008. 
 
  0-3%    3-7 %    7-10 %   
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.00  0.44  0.00  0.34  0.00  0.41 
Index  0.14 2.84  0.20 1.92 0.20 1.54 
Correlation -0.04  -1.11  -0.15  -1.61  -0.15  -1.30 
Swap  rate  -0.13 -1.31 -0.40 -1.61  -0.59 -2.11 
Slope 0.01  0.19  -0.04  -0.40  -0.01  -0.15 
Risk aversion  0.03 5.34  0.07 5.25  0.08 4.70 
Swap  spread  0.05 1.08 0.18 1.39  0.31 2.07 
Bid-ask  0.05 2.96  0.16 3.05  0.20 3.33 
Yen  -0.08 -0.55 -0.16 -0.38  -0.05 -0.11 
         
R² 0.28    0.27    0.27   
 
  10-15 %    15-30 %    30-100%   
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.00  0.73  0.00  0.81  0.00  0.74 
Index  0.39 3.05 0.32 1.87  0.43  1.28 
Correlation -0.17  -1.39  -0.19  -1.74  -1.13 -2.26 
Swap rate  -0.41  -1.38  -0.37  -1.16  0.05  0.09 
Slope 0.01  0.09  0.03  0.33  0.28  1.04 
Risk aversion  0.08 4.95  0.08 4.26  0.09 2.70 
Swap spread  0.23  1.33  0.30  1.74  -0.09  -0.31 
Bid-ask  0.19 2.99  0.20 2.98 0.02 0.14 
Yen -0.11  -0.21  0.13  0.23  -1.08  -0.66 
            
R²  0.26  0.20   0.04   
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Table 5b: Regression results of changes in log Traxx tranche premia on all factors 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of daily changes in the log iTraxx tranche premia on 
the variables listed in table 4. The adjusted R-square is denoted R² and t-statistics based on 
Newey-West standard errors are given adjacent to the coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked in 
bold are significant at 5 %. The sample is August 2004 to January 2008. 
 
  0-3%    3-6 %    6-9 %   
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept  0.00 -0.21 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.28 
Index  0.37 5.87  0.92 8.66  1.27 9.27 
Correlation  -0.06 -1.99 -0.07 -0.92 -0.12 -1.32 
Swap  rate  0.07 0.64 0.20 0.75 0.15 0.49 
Slope  0.02 0.45 0.04 0.35 0.10 0.76 
Risk  aversion  0.01 1.34 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.29 
Swap spread  0.13  1.27  0.52 2.32  0.50 2.19 
Bid-ask  0.02 2.28 0.04 1.88 0.04 1.32 
Yen  0.04 0.16 0.67 1.24 0.98 1.59 
        
R²  0.30  0.27  0.33  
 
 
  9-12  %  12-22  %  22-100%  
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.07  0.00  -0.12 
Index  1.30 9.88  1.35 9.35  1.25 6.86 
Correlation  -0.04  -0.37 -0.06  -0.61 0.12  0.93 
Swap  rate  0.16  0.46 0.47  1.36 0.64  1.62 
Slope 0.04  0.32  -0.09  -0.70  -0.27  -1.61 
Risk aversion  0.01  0.39  0.01  0.29  -0.02  -1.13 
Swap spread  0.64 2.51  0.72 2.79  0.97 3.76 
Bid-ask  0.07 2.42  0.08 2.62 0.04  1.22 
Yen  1.22  1.69 0.84  1.03 1.38  1.57 
           
R²  0.34     0.36     0.21    
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Table 6a: Regression results of changes in log CDX tranche premia on all factors 
with interaction effects 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of daily changes in the log CDX tranche premia on 
the variables listed in table 4 and the corresponding interaction effects. The adjusted R-square is 
denoted R² and t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors are given adjacent to the 
coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked in bold are significant at 5 %. The sample is August 2004 to 
January 2008. 
 
  0-3%    3-7 %    7-10 %   
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept  0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.63 0.00 -0.54 
Index  0.23 6.92  0.25 2.44 0.20 1.40 
Correlation  0.06 2.89 0.06 0.82 0.04 0.54 
Swap rate  -0.26 -2.80  -0.56 -2.19  -0.84 -2.62 
Slope  0.01 0.18 -0.08  -0.96  -0.06  -0.56 
Risk aversion  0.02 6.00  0.05 5.38  0.06 4.73 
Swap spread  0.05 0.86 0.14 0.94 0.26 1.48 
Bid-ask  0.02 2.23  0.08 2.45  0.11 2.96 
Yen  0.15 1.25 0.67 1.81 0.75 1.45 
D*Index  -0.23 -4.65  -0.27 -2.53 -0.21 -1.41 
D*Correlation  -0.14 -3.71 -0.12 -1.51 0.06  0.58 
D*Swap rate  0.14 1.06 0.44 1.61 0.75 2.08 
D*Slope  -0.01  -0.20 0.06 0.64 0.10 0.83 
D*Risk aversion  -0.02 -4.29  -0.06 -5.14  -0.06 -4.18 
D*Swap spread  0.00 -0.04 -0.13 -0.86 -0.17 -0.93 
D*Bid-ask  0.30 18.05  0.85 23.56  1.02 23.10 
D*Yen  0.00 0.00 -0.79  -1.39  -0.07  -0.11 
R²  0.54     0.55     0.54    
 
  10-15 %    15-30 %    30-100%   
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept  0.00 -0.16  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.06 
Index  0.49 3.80 0.20 1.56  0.18  0.45 
Correlation  0.05 0.49 -0.04 -0.44  -1.11  -1.76 
Swap rate  -0.76 -2.05  -0.92 -2.56 0.43 0.42 
Slope  -0.09 -0.69  0.11  1.09  0.18  0.42 
Risk aversion  0.06 4.25  0.06 4.74  0.06 1.98 
Swap spread  0.32 1.48  0.23  1.24  -0.65  -1.06 
Bid-ask  0.10 2.35  0.09 2.37 -0.12 -0.69 
Yen  0.86 1.69  1.08 2.27 0.35 0.17 
D*Index  -0.36 -2.21 -0.04 -0.20  0.07  0.14 
D*Correlation  0.04 0.29  0.29  1.49  0.79  1.02 
D*Swap rate  1.10 2.57 1.58 3.11 -0.22 -0.18 
D*Slope  0.19 1.20 -0.18 -1.02  0.16  0.34 
D*Risk aversion  -0.05 -3.10  -0.06 -2.50 -0.02 -0.49 
D*Swap spread  -0.49 -2.05 -0.26 -1.14  0.49  0.74 
D*Bid-ask  1.04 18.63  1.17 11.15  1.32 6.18 
D*Yen  -0.95 -0.78  -0.38  -0.22  0.54  0.19 
R²  0.51     0.44     0.11    
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Table 6b: Regression results of changes in log iTraxx tranche premia on all factors 
with interaction effects 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions of daily changes in the log iTraxx tranche premia on 
the variables listed in table 4 and the corresponding interaction effects. The adjusted R-squared is 
denoted R² and t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors are given adjacent to the 
coefficient estimates. Coefficients marked in bold are significant at 5 %. The sample is August 2004 to 
January 2008. 
 
  0-3%    3-6 %    6-9 %   
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept  0.00 0.28 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.59 
Index  0.52 11.97  0.89 6.00  1.15 5.45 
Correlation  -0.09 -4.01  -0.18 -2.65  -0.23 -2.96 
Swap rate  -0.07 -0.78 -0.14 -0.66 -0.33 -1.29 
Slope  0.02 0.38 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.68 
Risk aversion  0.01 0.91 -0.01  -0.45 0.00 -0.06 
Swap spread  0.05 0.72 0.21 1.27 0.06 0.31 
Bid-ask  0.02 2.20 0.03 1.38 0.02 0.54 
Yen  -0.04 -0.29 -0.04 -0.13 0.25  0.56 
D*Index  -0.24  -1.77 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.51 
D*Correlation  0.13 1.38 0.35 1.84 0.32 1.53 
D*Swap rate  1.09 2.41  2.58 2.30  3.70 2.53 
D*Slope  0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.27 
D*Risk aversion  0.01 0.39 0.07 1.28 0.08 1.51 
D*Swap spread  0.09 0.43 0.27 0.58 0.39 0.78 
D*Bid-ask  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.66 0.06 1.21 
D*Yen  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.66 0.06 1.21 
R²  0.34     0.31     0.37    
  9-12  %  12-22  %  22-100%  
  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat  E Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept  0.00 0.46  0.00  0.30  0.00  -0.26 
Index  1.24 7.31  1.01 6.23  0.83 3.27 
Correlation  -0.16 -2.00  -0.22 -2.63 0.04 0.21 
Swap rate  -0.44 -1.56  -0.22  -0.96  0.51  1.24 
Slope  0.11 0.80  0.02  0.21  -0.45 -2.08 
Risk aversion  0.00 0.04  0.01  0.52  -0.01  -0.71 
Swap spread  0.11 0.54  0.27  1.27  0.72 2.30 
Bid-ask  0.05 1.60  0.06 2.03 0.00 0.09 
Yen  0.47 1.03 -0.01 -0.02  0.76  1.07 
D*Index  0.03 0.09  0.54  1.94  0.70 2.26 
D*Correlation  0.38 1.39  0.39  1.63  0.13  0.52 
D*Swap rate  3.88 2.22  4.17 2.37 2.40 1.33 
D*Slope  -0.25 -0.82  -0.33  -1.21  0.32  0.97 
D*Risk aversion  0.08 1.47  0.06  1.07  0.05  0.92 
D*Swap spread  0.65 1.13  0.35  0.58  -0.08  -0.14 
D*Bid-ask  0.07 1.29  0.06  1.14  0.10  1.78 
D*Yen  0.07 1.29  0.06  1.14  0.10  1.78 
R²  0.39     0.41     0.24    36
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Table 7: Principal components analysis of CDX / iTraxx premia and residuals 
This table reports the variance proportions explained by the first two principal components for log 
changes of the tranche premia and the residuals of the multivariate regressions in table 5. The sample is 
August 2004 to January 2008.
Series  Variance Proportion of PC 1  Variance Proportion of PC 2 
CDX  0.86 0.08 
CDX residuals   0.82 0.09 
iTraxx  0.89 0.04 
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Graph 1a: Time series of CDX premia 
This graph plots the time series of the CDX index (top left) and the corresponding tranches. The sample 
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Graph 1b: Time series of iTraxx premia 
This graph plots the time series of the iTraxx index (top left) and the corresponding tranches. The 
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Graph 2: Time series of explanatory variables for iTraxx Tranche premia 
This graph plots the time series of the levels of the explanatory variables for the iTraxx tranches. The 
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Graph 3a: Impact of a one-standard deviation change in explanatory variables on 
CDX 
This graph plots the impact of a one-standard deviation change in each explanatory variable in the 
regressions on the iTraxx tranche premia. The impact is expressed as a fraction of the standard 



















Graph 3b: Impact of a one-standard deviation change in explanatory variables on 
iTraxx 
This graph plots the Impact of a one-standard deviation change in explanatory variables in the 
regressions of the CDX tranche premia. The impact is expressed as a fraction of the standard deviation 
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Graph 4a: R² of block-wise regressions on CDX tranche premia 
This graph plots the R-squared goodness of fit measures of the bivariate regressions of the iTraxx 
tranche premia. The four blocks are credit risk (Index and Base correlation), Interest rate factors (level 
and slope), risk aversion (JP Morgan index) and liquidity risk (swap spread, bid-ask, Yen). The sample 











































Graph 4b: R² of block-wise regressions on iTraxx tranche premia 
This graph plots the R-squared goodness of fit measures of the block-wise regressions of the iTraxx 
tranche premia. The four blocks are credit risk (Index and Base correlation), Interest rate factors (level 
and slope), risk aversion (JP Morgan index) and liquidity risk (swap spread, bid-ask, Yen). The sample 
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Graph 5a: Rolling correlations of changes in log iTraxx tranche premia and changes 
in the bid ask spread 
This graph plots the rolling bivariate correlations of the first differences of the log premia of the 0-3%, 3-
6%, 6-9%, 9-12% and 12-22% tranches and the changes in the bid ask spread. The estimation is based 























Graph 5b: Rolling correlations of changes in log iTraxx tranche premia and changes 
in risk aversion 
This graph plots the rolling bivariate correlations of the first differences of the log premia of the 0-3%, 3-
6%, 6-9%, 9-12% and 12-22% tranches and the change in risk aversion. The estimation is based on a 
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